Facts of the Case

The case dates back to 1986, where the accused allegedly raped a minor girl. The trial began in 1987, and the Sessions Court convicted the accused under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the rape of the child. The Sessions Court handed down a sentence to the accused. However, this conviction was later overturned by the Rajasthan High Court in 2013, which argued that the victim’s silence and tears during cross-examination meant that the prosecution had failed to prove its case. The victim’s inability to give a coherent testimony was a key point in the High Court’s decision to acquit the accused.

The State, disagreeing with the High Court’s conclusion, appealed to the Supreme Court to reinstate the original conviction, pointing out that other evidence supported the case against the accused.

Contention of the Petitioner (State)

The State’s argument was that the High Court had incorrectly relied solely on the victim’s silence and emotional reaction during cross-examination to acquit the accused. The State emphasized that child victims of sexual crimes might experience trauma, which could explain their silence or tears. The prosecution argued that the child’s emotional response should not be interpreted as a defence for the accused. The State also pointed out that substantial medical and circumstantial evidence corroborated the charge of rape, and therefore, the conviction should stand.

Contention of the Respondent (Accused)

The defense, on the other hand, contended that the High Court was correct in giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused, based on the victim’s failure to testify. The accused argued that the silence of the victim during the trial, particularly her inability to speak about the crime, made the case uncertain and weakened the prosecution’s evidence. The defense sought the acquittal of the accused, focusing on the absence of direct evidence from the victim herself.

Court’s Observation

The Supreme Court, while reviewing the case, made several important observations. It addressed the issue of whether the silence of the child victim could be used to benefit the accused. The Court emphasized that the emotional response of the child — silence and shedding tears — could not be considered an indication of the accused’s innocence. “The silence here is that of a child. It cannot be equated with the silence of a fully realised adult prosecutrix, which again would have to be weighed in its own circumstances.”

The Court also pointed out that a child might not be able to fully articulate the trauma of the crime, which could explain why she remained silent during her examination. The Court cited precedents such as State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat, where the absence of testimony from the victim did not prevent a conviction, as long as other evidence, such as medical or circumstantial evidence, supported the case.

The Court further observed that trauma could prevent the child from speaking about the crime in a detailed manner, and this silence could not automatically lead to the acquittal of the accused. “Trauma has engulfed her in silence. It would be unfair to burden her young shoulders with the weight of the entire prosecution.”

Moreover, the Court criticized the High Court for revealing the identity of the victim, which was a violation of her privacy rights.

Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court decided to overturn the High Court’s decision, thereby restoring the conviction of the accused. The Court ruled that the absence of direct testimony from the victim should not be seen as a reason to favor the accused, especially when there was other strong evidence available, such as medical reports and circumstantial evidence, pointing to the guilt of the accused.

The Court stated, “Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions.” The Court emphasized that a reasonable doubt is not based on abstract possibilities but on actual, substantial doubts grounded in evidence.

The original sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment under Section 376 of the IPC was restored, and the accused was directed to surrender before the authorities to serve the sentence.

Credits: Deeksha Rai