Subsequent Marriage During Bail or Birth of Child ‘Immaterial’ in POCSO Offences: MP High Court Upholds

The matter before the Madhya Pradesh High Court arose from the conviction of an accused for offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The prosecution case was that the victim, a school-going girl, was subjected to repeated incidents of sexual assault. A complaint was lodged after the victim informed her family members of the incidents.

During the trial, the prosecution relied on school admission records, a birth certificate, family testimony, and medical evidence to establish the age of the victim. These documents indicated that the victim was below eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offences. On this basis, the trial court held that the statutory ingredients of aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act were satisfied and convicted the accused, imposing a sentence of rigorous imprisonment.

While the appeal against conviction was pending before the High Court, it was brought on record that the accused had married the victim during the period when he was on bail, and that a child had been born from the marriage.

Contentions

The appellant sought suspension of sentence and leniency on the ground that the victim was close to the age of majority and that the relationship was consensual. It was further contended that the subsequent marriage and birth of a child constituted relevant circumstances warranting indulgence, particularly as the victim was allegedly dependent on the accused for care and support.

Reliance was placed on certain decisions of the Supreme Court where relief had been granted in cases involving adolescent relationships, and it was argued that similar considerations should apply in the present case.

The State opposed the appeal, submitting that under the POCSO Act, consent of a minor is immaterial in law. It was argued that the decisive factor is the age of the victim at the time of the offence and that subsequent developments cannot affect criminal liability. The State further contended that the discretionary powers exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are not available to High Courts.

Judgment

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence. The Court held that the evidence on record conclusively established that the victim was a minor at the time of the offence and therefore fell within the definition of “child” under the POCSO Act.

The Court observed that once the offence is complete, subsequent events such as marriage during bail proceedings or the birth of a child from such marriage are immaterial for determining culpability or granting indulgence under the POCSO Act. It reiterated that consent of a minor has no legal significance.

The Court also distinguished the Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the appellant, noting that those cases involved the exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, which are not vested in High Courts. On this basis, the Court declined to interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Written by Adv. Aiswarya Krishnan

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