Facts of the Case

On 14 October 2019, a 15-year-old girl (the prosecutrix) lodged a complaint at Kurud Police Station in Dhamtari district, Chhattisgarh. She alleged that while returning home from school accompanied by her friends Heena and Kajal, the respondent, Mr. R, followed her and shouted her name followed by the phrase “I Love You”. She further stated that this was not a one-time incident, as the respondent had previously misbehaved with her and had been reprimanded by teachers. Based on her complaint, an FIR was registered against him under Sections 354-D (stalking) and 509 (insulting the modesty of a woman) of the Indian Penal Code, Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The case was tried by the Special Court under the POCSO Act, which acquitted the respondent on 27 May 2022. Aggrieved by the acquittal, the State of Chhattisgarh filed an appeal before the High Court under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Contentions of the Appellant (State)

The State of Chhattisgarh argued that the trial court had erred in its appreciation of evidence, particularly in disbelieving the birth certificate (Exhibit P-3) submitted during trial, which clearly showed the prosecutrix’s date of birth as 29 November 2004, establishing her minority at the time of the alleged incident. The State contended that the testimonies of the prosecutrix and her two friends clearly suggested a pattern of repeated harassment by the accused. It was also submitted that the accused was aware of the caste identity of the prosecutrix and that the alleged offence was committed against a minor belonging to a Scheduled Caste, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The State criticized the trial court for failing to record any finding on the caste-based motivation behind the act and for not giving adequate weight to the statements of key prosecution witnesses. On these grounds, it was submitted that the acquittal was unjustified and liable to be set aside.

Contentions of the Respondent (Accused)

The respondent, in defending the trial court’s judgment, argued that the essential ingredients for the alleged offences were not made out. With respect to Section 354-D IPC, he submitted that there was no proof of repeated following or contact, and that the prosecutrix had never indicated clear disinterest in his conduct—a mandatory element as per judicial precedent. He relied on the decision in Navendu Sudhir Gupta v. Honey Navendu Gupta (2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2078), where the Bombay High Court held that mere interaction without the victim’s explicit disinterest cannot constitute stalking. As for the charge under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, the respondent pointed out that the prosecutrix did not allege that the incident occurred due to her caste. Relying on Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2020) 18 SCC 763], he argued that caste-based intention is a necessary prerequisite for invoking the SC/ST Act, and that no such intention was evident in this case. He also questioned the credibility of the prosecutrix’s version, citing inconsistencies and lack of corroboration.

Court’s Observations

(i) On the Age of the Prosecutrix

The trial court had questioned the reliability of the birth certificate, citing the absence of supporting oral testimony. However, the High Court disagreed with this assessment. It held that the birth certificate (Ex. P-3) was issued by the competent government authority under the applicable statutory provisions and its authenticity had not been challenged during the proceedings. The Court observed:

“It was issued by the competent authority… and its authenticity was not disputed… it cannot be presumed that it was obtained with an ulterior motive.”
On this basis, the Court concluded that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged incident.

(ii) On the Offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act

The Court examined whether the respondent’s conduct could amount to sexual assault under Section 7, which is punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. It reiterated that the existence of sexual intent is a critical element for an offence under this provision. Referring to Attorney General for India v. Satish [(2022) 5 SCC 545], the Court observed:

“The most important ingredient for constituting the offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of the Act is the ‘sexual intent’ and not the ‘skin-to-skin’ contact with the child.”
Applying this principle, the Court held that the respondent’s verbal expression—saying “I Love You”—without any physical contact or suggestive gestures, did not demonstrate sexual intent. Therefore, no offence under the POCSO Act was made out.

(iii) On the Offence under Section 354-D IPC (Stalking)

The Court underscored that stalking requires proof of repeated following or attempts to contact the victim despite a clear indication of disinterest. In the present case, no material was brought on record to show that the prosecutrix had communicated disinterest to the accused. The Court stated:

“There is no material to demonstrate that the victim clearly indicated to the accused her disinterest in his advances.” In the absence of this element, the Court concluded that the offence of stalking was not established.

(iv) On the Offence under Section 509 IPC (Insulting the Modesty of a Woman)

The High Court examined whether the respondent had used any obscene or derogatory language aimed at insulting the modesty of the prosecutrix. The FIR (Ex. P-7) did not contain any such allegation, and there was no corroboration of this claim by any of the witnesses, including the prosecutrix’s friends. The Court held:

“Her version to this effect is… not trustworthy and/or sufficient to implicate the respondent for the offence under Section 509 of IPC.”

(v) On the Offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act

With regard to the applicability of the SC/ST Act, the Court noted that there was no assertion by the prosecutrix that the act was committed because of her Scheduled Caste identity. The Court emphasized that caste-based intent is an essential component for invoking this provision. Relying on Khuman Singh, the Court reiterated:

“She has not stated even a whisper that the respondent has committed the alleged offence because of knowing the fact that she is a member of ‘Scheduled Caste community’.”
Since the prosecution failed to establish any caste-based motivation, the charge under the SC/ST Act could not be sustained.

Court’s Order

The High Court ultimately held that while the minor status of the prosecutrix was clearly established through admissible documentary evidence, the respondent’s actions did not satisfy the legal requirements for conviction under any of the alleged offences. Specifically, there was no evidence of sexual intent to justify a charge under the POCSO Act, no repeated conduct or indication of disinterest to make out stalking under Section 354-D IPC, and no caste-based motive to invoke the SC/ST Act. Finding no merit in the State’s appeal, the Court upheld the trial court’s acquittal of the accused. Consequently, the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed.

Written by Adv. Deeksha Rai