Facts of the Case

The Kerala High Court was called upon to decide the legality and criminality of corporal punishment inflicted by teachers on students, in the context of three separate criminal miscellaneous petitions. Each petition sought the quashing of FIRs lodged against school-teachers for allegedly caning or physically punishing students. In the first case, a teacher was accused of caning a 9-year-old student for poor performance in dictation and publicly sharing his zero marks on WhatsApp. In the second case, another teacher was alleged to have caned a six-year-old for inattentiveness in class. The third case involved a temporary dance teacher accused of beating a 9-year-old girl repeatedly on her thighs with a PVC pipe during practice for the annual day celebrations. These incidents were prosecuted under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court heard all three matters together due to the common legal question they raised whether corporal punishment by teachers is an offence under current Indian law.

Contentions of the Petitioner

The petitioners argued that corporal punishment, while disapproved of in pedagogical and moral terms, does not constitute a criminal offence under any penal statute as it stands today. It was submitted that Section 82 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, which defines corporal punishment, does not expressly include teachers within its ambit, and thus cannot be invoked to prosecute them for acts done in the course of disciplining students. The counsel invoked the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law), contending that criminal liability cannot be imposed unless the conduct is clearly defined as an offence in a penal statute. It was further argued that India’s legal system is dualist in nature international conventions, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, are not automatically enforceable unless incorporated into domestic law. In the absence of such incorporation, international obligations cannot override statutory interpretation. The petitioners also highlighted that the punishment, if any, was minimal and motivated by a bona fide intention to discipline students rather than to harm or humiliate them and hence lacked any criminal intent or mens rea.

Contentions of the Respondents

Opposing the petitions, the Amicus Curiae appointed by the Court, Adv. Jacob P. Alex, urged the Court to read the issue in light of India’s international obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, which India has ratified. He emphasized Articles 16, 28(2), and 37(a) of the Convention, which prohibit arbitrary interference with a child’s dignity and expressly forbid cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, including physical punishment in schools. He also referred to Section 17 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, which categorically prohibits physical punishment and mental harassment in schools. The Amicus argued that although corporal punishment may not be expressly criminalised under current penal laws, its continuation undermines the child’s fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, including the right to life, dignity, and bodily integrity. Drawing from decisions such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, it was submitted that courts must interpret domestic law in a manner consistent with constitutional and international norms. The Senior Public Prosecutor added that corporal punishment, especially when inflicted on vulnerable or recovering children, could amount to criminal conduct, particularly under Section 75 of the JJ Act or relevant provisions of the IPC and BNS. In one of the cases, it was pointed out that the victim child had recently undergone surgery, making the act especially cruel.

Court’s Observations

Justice C. Jayachandran, writing for the Kerala High Court, undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework, international conventions, and evolving judicial precedent. The Court began by acknowledging that corporal punishment by teachers, even if intended to discipline, is not consistent with modern educational norms or constitutional morality. Nonetheless, the Court made a crucial legal distinction: unless a specific penal statute expressly criminalises such conduct, it cannot be prosecuted as an offence. The Court held that Section 82 of the JJ Act, which defines corporal punishment, does not criminalise the act when committed by teachers. Rather, this section appears to consciously omit teachers from the class of offenders, implying legislative intent not to prosecute them under this provision. Similarly, Section 118 of the BNS, which relates to causing hurt with dangerous weapons, was deemed inapplicable since a cane is not an instrument designed to cause death or grievous harm.

However, the Court clarified that its observations do not extend to cases involving sadistic or disproportionate punishment. Where a teacher inflicts pain on a vital part of the body or uses unreasonable or dangerous instruments, such conduct may attract penal liability under other provisions, such as Section 323 of the IPC or Section 75 of the JJ Act, provided the element of unnecessary cruelty or malafide intent is established. The Court also distinguished between disciplinary gestures and criminal assault, noting that punishment cannot be labelled “unnecessary” merely because it caused discomfort, unless it is excessive or actuated by bad faith. The Court declined to accept that international conventions could be directly enforced to create criminal liability, reaffirming India’s dualist approach which requires statutory incorporation of treaty norms.

Court’s Order

Based on its legal analysis, the Court partially allowed the petitions. It quashed the FIRs, noting that the acts of caning, though pedagogically discouraged, did not constitute an offence under existing penal statutes. However, the Court declined to quash the FIR, where the teacher was alleged to have repeatedly beaten a child with a PVC pipe on the thighs. In this case, the Court found that the offence under Section 323 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt) was prima facie made out. Although it held that offences under Section 324 IPC and Section 75 of the JJ Act were not applicable, it permitted the Investigating Officer to amend the final report to reflect Section 323 IPC and proceed accordingly.

The Court also expressly rejected the adage “Spare the rod, spoil the child” as incompatible with constitutional values and international child rights obligations.

Written by Adv. Deeksha Rai